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How has Mobile Phone Penetration Stimulated Financial Development in 
Africa?
Abstract
In the first macroeconomic empirical assessment of the relationship between  mobile 
phones and finance, this paper examines the correlations between mobile phone penetration 
and financial  development  using two conflicting definitions  of the financial  system in the 
financial  development  literature.  With the traditional  IFS (2008) definition,  mobile  phone 
penetration  has  a  negative  correlation  with  traditional  financial  intermediary  dynamics  of 
depth,  activity  and  size.  However,  when  a  previously  missing  informal-financial  sector 
component  is  integrated  into  the  definition,  mobile  phone  penetration  has  a  positive 
correlation with informal financial development. Three implications result: there is a growing 
role  of  informal  finance;  mobile  phone  penetration  may  not  be  positively  assessed  at  a 
macroeconomic level by traditional financial development indicators and; it is a wake-up call 
for  scholarly  research  on  informal  financial  development  indicators  which  will  oriented 
monetary policy.
JEL Classification: E00; G20; L96; O17; O33
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1. Introduction
The mobile revolution has transformed the lives of many Africans, providing not just 
communications but also basic financial access in the forms of phone-based money transfer 
and storage (Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012). The high growth 
and penetration rates of mobile telephony that are transforming cell phones into pocket-banks 
in Africa is providing opportunities for countries on the continent to increase affordable and 
cost-effective means of bringing on board a large chunk of the population that hitherto has 
been excluded from formal financial services for decades. Such a transformation is of interest 
not only to banks and Micro Financial Institutions (MFIs) but also to governments, financial 
regulators  as  well  as  development  partners  who  are  providing  support  to  improve  the 
livelihoods of Africans through poverty reduction and sustained economic growth. 
At the Connect Africa summit in 2007, Paul Kagame, president of Rwanda asserted: 
“in ten short years, what was once an object of luxury and privilege, the mobile phone has  
become a basic necessity in Africa” (Aker & Mbiti, 2010, 208). An article in The Economist 
(2008) also reported: “a device that was a yuppie toy not so long ago has now become a  
potent for economic development in the world’s poorest countries”. This paper seeks to assess 
if these sentiments and slogans are reflected in the correlation of mobile phone penetration 
with financial development in Africa?
Beyond, the need to investigate these perceptions, there is a growing body of work 
pointing to the imperative of more scholarly research on a phenomenon whose time is now: 
mobile banking. To the best of our knowledge, one of the most exhaustive accounts of the 
‘mobile phone’ development literature concludes: “Existing empirical evidence on the effect  
of mobile phone coverage and services suggest that the mobile phone can potentially serve as  
a tool for economic development in Africa. But this evidence while certainly encouraging  
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remains limited. First, while economic studies have focused on the effects of mobile phones  
for particular countries or markets, there is little evidence showing that this has translated  
into  macroeconomic  gains…” (Aker  & Mbiti,  2010,  224).  Also,  as  sustained  by Maurer 
(2008) and confirmed in subsequent literature (Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Thacker & Wright, 
2012), scholarly research on the adoption and socioeconomic impacts of mobile (m) banking 
(payments) systems in the developing world is scarce. From a broad perspective, most studies 
on mobile banking have been theoretical and qualitative in nature (Maurer, 2008; Jonathan & 
Camilo, 2008; Merritt,  2010; Thacker & Wright, 2012). The few existing empirical works 
hinge on country-specific  and micro-level  data  (collected from surveys)  for the most  part 
(Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012). 
This  paper  aims  to  assess  the  correlations  between  mobile  phones  and   financial 
development dynamics. By distinguishing correlations between formal and informal financial 
intermediary  sectors,  findings  could  have  substantial  policy  relevance;  especially  on  the 
concern  of  examining  which  financial  sectors  are  benefiting  most  from  the  soaring 
phenomenon of mobile phone penetration. The seminal character of this work also adds to the 
literature by proposing some hitherto unexplored dimensions of financial development which 
could  provide  the  much  needed guidance  to  policy makers  on  the  financial  development 
empirics of mobile phones. The paper is a descriptive study that extends “Mobile Bank in 
Africa: Taking the Bank to the people” Ondiege (2010). Hence, the study is more informative 
in  nature.  In  other  words,  the  paper  contributes  at  the  same  time  to  the  macroeconomic 
literature on measuring financial development and responds to the growing field of economic 
development  by  means  of  informal  financial  sector  promotion,  microfinance  and  mobile 
banking. It suggests a practicable way to disentangle the correlations between ‘mobile phone 
penetration’  and  various  financial  sectors.  Our  contribution  to  the  literature  is  therefore 
threefold. Firstly, we complement existing theoretical literature on the mobile-finance nexus 
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by providing the first macroeconomic descriptive empirical assessment on the correlations 
between the growing phenomenon of mobile phones with financial development2. Secondly, 
owing to the debate over which financial  sectors are benefiting most  from ‘mobile phone 
penetration’,  we assess its impact by disentangling financial  depth to include a previously 
missing  component.  Hence,  we  are  able  to  capture  both  formal  and  informal  financial 
intermediary  development  effects.  Thirdly,  based  on  the  findings,  we  provide  relevant 
measures that could guide future search and macroeconomic policy. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews  existing literature. 
Data  and  methodology  are  presented  and  outlined  respectively  in  Section  3.  Empirical 
analysis is covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Existing literature 
There are four main avenues along which the incidence of mobile phone penetration 
on mobile  banking could be discussed. The first  strand captures the usefulness of mobile 
transactions (store of value, conversion of cash and, transfer of stored value). The concepts of 
savings (basic or partially intergrated) in mobile banking are eludicated in the second strand. 
The  third  strand  relates  mobile  banking  to  GSM phones  while  the  fourth  presents  some 
statistics on the proliferation of mobile banking in Africa. 
2 “Relative to the spread of some other technologies that have been introduced in sub-Saharan Africa-improved  
seeds, solar cook stoves and agricultural technology-mobile phones adoption has occurred at a staggering rate  
on the continent. Yet few empirical economic studies have examined mobile phone adoption. This could be due  
to  a  variety  of  factors,  including  unreliable  or  nonexistent  data  on  individual  level  adoption  (leading  to  
measurement error)…” Aker & Mbiti (2010, 225).
5
In the first strand,  Jonathan & Camilo (2008) stress that,  most mobile transactions3 in 
the developing world enable users to do three things. (a) Store value (currency) in an account 
accessible  via  a  handset.  When  the  user  already has  a  bank account,  this  is  generally  a 
question of linking to a bank account. If the user does not have an account, then the process 
creates a bank account for him/her or creates a pseudo bank account, held by a third party or 
the user’s mobile operator. (b) Convert cash into and out of the store value account. When the  
account is linked to a bank account, then users can visit banks to cash-in and cash-out. In 
many  instances,  users  can  also  visit  the  GSM  providers’  retail  stores.  In  most  flexible 
services, a user can visit a corner kiosk or grocery store (maybe the same one where he/she 
purchases  airtime)  and transact  with  an  independent  retailer  working as  an agent  for  the 
transaction system. (c) Transfer stored value between accounts. Users can generally transfer 
funds between accounts linked to two mobile phones, by using a set of SMS messages (or 
menu commands) and PIN codes. The new services offer a way to move money from place to 
place  and  present  an  alternative  to  the  payments  system  offered  by  banks,  pawn shops, 
remittance firms…etc.  The uptake of m-banking (payments) systems has been particularly 
strong  in  the  Philippines  (where  three  million  customers  use  systems  offered  by  mobile 
operators Smart & Globe;  Neville,  2006); Kenya (where nearly two million users registered 
with Safaricom M-PESA  system within a year  of its nationwide rollout,  Vaughan, 2007; 
Ivatury & Mas, 2008) and South Africa where 450, 000 people use Wizzit (‘the bank in your 
pocket’; Ivatury & Pickens, 2006) or one of two other national systems (Porteous, 2007). 
3 In order to have a mobile money account and make a deposit, a customer must own a cell phone SIM card with 
the mobile operator and register for a mobile money account. The customer then makes cash deposits at the  
physical  offices of one of the operator’s mobile money agents.  These cash deposits create electronic money 
credit in the account. Customers can make person-to-person transfers of mobile money credit to the accounts of 
other mobile money users in the same network. They can also use their mobile money credit to pay bills and to 
buy phone airtime. Withdrawals  (conversion to cash) could be made at the offices  of the network’s mobile  
money agents. There is also a possibility for a mobile money customer to make a transfer to someone who is not 
registered with the same network. In this case,  when notice of the transfer is received through an SMS text  
message, the recipient can receive the cash at a mobile money agent (Demombynes, & Thegeya, 2012).
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The second strand elucidates the concept of savings. Demombynes & Thegeya (2012) 
have approached the mobile-finance nexus through this concept. They distinguish two types 
of mobile savings. (a)  Basic mobile savings; which is simply the use of a standard mobile 
money system such  as  M-PESA to  store  funds.  These  basic  mobile  savings  do  not  earn 
interest. Bank-integrated mobile savings perspectives have received a great deal of attention 
as a way to provide banking services to the poor. They have the edge of offering access to 
basic banking services without requiring proximity to a physical bank branch. Hence, with a 
bank-integrated mobile savings account,  basic banking services can be accessed through a 
network of mobile phone agents, which in Kenya outnumber the weight of bank branches 
significantly (Mas & Radcliffe,  2011).  (b) The term ‘partially  integrated’ mobile  savings 
system is also used to describe situations where bank account access via mobile phones is 
contingent on the establishment of a traditional account at a physical bank. More so, banks are 
beginning  to  build  their  own  agent  networks  in  order  to  assume  a  more  competitive 
bargaining  position  in  accessing  mobile  service  platforms.  Fully  and  partially  integrated 
savings present different types of contracts among the partnering bank and mobile service 
provider.  According  to  Demombynes  &  Thegeya  (2012);  on  the  one  hand,  a  partially 
integrated product clearly delineates the role of the bank (which provides and owns banking 
services)  from  that  of  the  mobile  service  provider  (which  provides  mobile  telephony 
infrastructure and controls the agent network). Thus, the bank compensates the mobile service 
provider for access to the network and enjoys the remaining profits. This type of contract 
more closely looks like a debt contract between parties. On the other hand, a fully integrated 
solution may not draw the same distinction between bank and mobile service providers. In 
this case, the distribution of surplus is contingent on the relative bargaining power of the bank 
and mobile service provider. This sort of contract more closely resembles an equity contract 
between two parties. Equity-like contracts are more likely to be complex and therefore more 
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difficult to negotiate than debt-like contracts, there-by presenting a potential hurdle towards 
the goal of increasing access. 
In the third strand, mobile banking is linked to GSM phones. Ondiege (2010), Chief 
Economist of the African Development Bank looks at the mobile-finance nexus from four 
perspectives. Firstly, the mobile phone can serve as a virtual bank card where customer and 
institution information can be securely stored, thereby avoiding the cost of distributing cards 
to customers. In fact he postulates, the subscriber identity module (SIM) card inside most (if  
not all) GSM phones is in itself a smartcard (similar to the virtual bank card). Therefore, the 
banks customer’s PIN and account number can be stored on this SIM card to perform the 
same functions as the bank virtual card. Secondly, the mobile phone may serve as a point of 
sale (POS) terminal. As such, a mobile phone could be used to transact and communicate with 
the appropriate financial  institution to solicit transaction authorization.  These are the same 
functions of a POS terminal at mails, retail or other stores. A mobile phone can duplicate 
these functionalities with ease. Thirdly, the mobile phone can also be used as an ATM. A POS 
is thus used to pay for goods and services at the store. If cash and access to savings were to be 
considered as ‘goods and services’, that customers buy and store, then the POS will also serve 
as a cash collection and distribution point which basically is the function of an automatic 
teller  machine  (ATM).  Fourthly,  the  mobile  phone  may  be  used  as  an  Internet  banking 
terminal. Implying, it offers two fundamental customer services: a) ability to make payments 
and transfers remotely and; b) instant access to any account. Hence, the mobile phone device 
and wireless connectivity bring the internet terminal into the hands of otherwise unbanked 
customers.  
A clearer  picture of  the proliferation  of  mobile  banking is  presented in  the fourth 
strand with some statistics. Borrowing from Mbiti & Weil (2011), the story of the growth of 
mobile  phones  in  Africa  is  one  of  a  tectonic  and unexpected  change in  communications 
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technology. From virtually unconnected in the 1990s, over 60% of Africa now has mobile 
phone coverage and there are now over ten times as many mobiles as landline phones in use 
(Aker & Mbiti, 2010).  In line with Aker & Mbiti (2010), mobile phone coverage in Africa 
has progressed at staggering rates over the past decade. In 1999, only 11% of the African 
population  had  mobile  phone  coverage,  primarily  in  Northern  (Egypt,  Algeria,  Libya, 
Morocco and Tunisia) and Sothern (Kenya and South Africa) Africa.  By 2008, 60% of the 
population (477 million) could get a signal and an area of 11.2 million square kilometers had 
mobile phone coverage: equivalent to the United Sates and Argentina combined. By the turn 
of 2012, it is projected that most villages in Africa will have coverage with only a handful of  
countries relatively unconnected. Borrowing from Demombynes & Thegeya (2012), Kenya 
has undergone a remarkable information and communication technology (ICT) revolution. At 
the turn of the 1990s, less than 3% of Kenyan households owned a telephone and less than 1 
in 1000 Kenyan adults had mobile phone service. However, by the end of 2011, 93 percent of 
Keynan households  owned a mobile  phone.  This soar  is  largely credited  to  the M-PESA 
mobile-banking network (Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012, 23-25).
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data
We examine a  sample of 52 African countries with data from African Development 
Indicators  (ADI)  and  the  Financial  Development  and  Structure  Database  (FDSD)  of  the 
World  Bank  (WB).  The  mobile  phone  penetration  rate  is  obtained  from  the  African 
Development  Bank  (AfDB).  In  line  with  existing  literature  we  proxy  for  ‘mobile 
banking/activities’ with the ‘mobile penetration’ rate (Ondiege, 2010; Aker & Mbiti, 2010). 
Owing to constraints in the time series properties of the mobile penetration measurement, data 
structure is cross-sectional and consists of 2003-2009 average growth rates4. While formal 
4 Data on ‘mobile phone penetration’ is thesame as in Ondiege (2010). 
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financial intermediary development indicators are directly extracted from the FDSD, semi-
formal  and  informal  financial  indicators  are  computed  from  the  FDSD  in  line  with 
propositions from Asongu (2011a). 
Details  about the variables’ definitions  and data  sources,  descriptive  statistics  with 
presentation of countries and correlation analysis (showing the basic correlations between key 
variables employed in this paper) are presented in the appendices.  The summary statistics 
(Appendix 1) of the variables used in the cross-country regressions show that, there is quite a 
degree  of  variation  in  the  data  utilized  so  that  one  should  be  confident  that  reasonable 
estimated relationships should emerge. The purpose of the correlation matrix (Appendix 2) is 
to  manage  issues  resulting  from  overparametization  and  multicolinearity.   Based  on  the 
correlation  coefficients,  there  do  not  appear  to  be  any  serious  concerns  in  terms  of  the 
relationships to be estimated. Source and definition of the variables are reported in Appendix 
3. 
In a bid for clarity in presentation, we classify selected variables into two main strands 
below. 
3.1.1 Financial intermediary development dependent variables 
a) Financial depth
Borrowing from the FDSD and recent African finance literature (Asongu, 2011bcd), 
this  paper  measures  financial  depth from two standpoints:  overall-economic  and financial 
system perspectives with indicators of broad money supply (M2/GDP) and financial system 
deposits  (Fdgdp)  respectively.  While  the former  denotes  the monetary base plus  demand, 
saving and time deposits, the later indicates liquid liabilities. Since we are dealing exclusively 
with  developing countries,  we distinguish  liquid  liabilities  from money supply because  a 
substantial chunk of the monetary base does not transit through the banking sector (Asongu, 
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2011bcd).  The two indicators are in ratios of GDP (see Appendix 3) and both can robustly 
cross-check  each other  as  either  accounts  for  over  97% of  information  in  the  other  (see 
Appendix 2).
b) Financial efficiency
By financial intermediation efficiency here, this study neither refers to a profitability-
oriented concept nor to the production efficiency of decision making units in the financial 
sector (through Data Envelopment Analysis: DEA). What we seek to highlight is the ability of 
banks to  effectively fulfill  their  fundamental  role  of  transforming mobilized  deposits  into 
credit for economic operators (agents). We adopt proxies for banking-system-efficiency and 
financial-system-efficiency (respectively ‘bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd’ and ‘financial 
system  credit  on  financial  system  deposits: Fcfd’).  Like  with  financial  depth,  these  two 
financial allocation efficiency proxies can cross-check each other as they represent more than 
83% of variability in one another (see Appendix 2).
c) Financial size
With respect  to  the FDSD, we measure  financial  intermediary size as  the ratio  of 
“deposit bank assets” to “total assets” (deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit 
bank assets: Dbacba). 
d) Financial activity
By financial  intermediary activity here,  the work highlights the ability of banks to 
grant credit to economic operators.  We proxy for both banking system intermediary activity 
and financial  system intermediary activity with “private domestic  credit  by deposit  banks: 
Pcrb”  and  “private  credit  by  domestic  banks  and  other  financial  institutions:  Pcrbof” 
respectively.  The later measure cross-checks the former as it represents more than 92% of 
information in the former (see Appendix 2).
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e) Formal, informal and semi-formal financial developments
In  line  with  Asongu  (2011a):  formal financial  development  is  the  ratio  of  bank 
deposits  (liabilities)5 on  GDP  (or  M2)  in  absolute  (or  relative)  terms;  absolute informal 
financial development (Informal 1) is measured as the difference between money supply (M2) 
and financial system deposits6 in percentage of GDP; relative informal financial development 
(Informal  2)7 is  measured  as  the  difference  between  money  supply  and  financial  system 
deposits  in  percentage  of  M2;  informal  and  semi-formal  financial  development8 is  the 
difference between M2 and bank deposits in percentage of M2.
3.1.2 Control variables
 
In the regressions, we shall control for the macro economic environment (inflation, 
government expenditure and domestic savings), financial openness (foreign direct investment: 
FDI) and the quality of institutions (regulation quality). The following discussion is relevant 
to their  expected signs in relation  to financial  development  dynamics.  (1) While  low and 
stable inflation rates generally provide a conducive environment for financial development, 
high inflation on the other hand, does quite the opposite. In addition, recent African finance 
literature has established a negative association between inflation and financial intermediary 
allocation efficiency (Asongu, 2011e). (2) Government expenditure could decrease financial 
depth  if  the  budget  allocated  for  investment  is  misallocated  through  corrupt  practices 
(Ndikumana, 2000). (3) Savings improve financial depth (liquid liabilities). (4) While capital 
5 Bank deposits here refer to demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks. See Lines 24 and 25 of  
International  Financial  Statistics  (IFS,  October  2008)  for  the  definition  of  formal  financial  intermediary 
development. 
6 Financial  deposits  are  demand,  time  and  saving  deposits  in  deposit  money  banks  and  other  financial  
institutions. See Lines 24, 25 and 45 of IFS (October, 2008). 
7 This is a measure of sector importance in financial development.  That is, from  formal  and  semi-formal to 
‘informal’ financial development: (Informalization). This proposition appreciates the deterioration of the formal 
and semi-formal banking sectors to the benefit of the informal sector. See Asongu (2011a). 
8 This is also a measure of sector importance in financial development. That is, from formal to ‘semi-formal and 
informal’  financial development: (Semi-informalisation and informalization). This proposition appreciates the 
deterioration of the formal banking sector to the benefit of other sectors (informal and semi-formal). See Asongu 
(2011a).
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account openness in terms of FDI increases financial depth, it decreases financial efficiency. 
It is logical that FDI increases the use of currency. However, recent African openness-finance 
literature  has  found  FDI  to  significantly  deteriorate  financial  intermediary  allocation 
efficiency because,  the  domestic  financial  sector  has  a  less  competitive  advantage  in  the 
financial  service  industry  (Asongu,  2010).  (5)  Though  microfinance  (and  other  forms  of 
informal  finance)  at  least  in its  (their)  initial  stages can strive without  relying  heavily on 
government regulation, too much regulation and strong legal institutions that permit the poor 
to borrow against  their  assets  could significantly affect  the smooth  growth of this  (these) 
sector (s). This explanation is consistent with Batuo et al. (2010). 
3.2 Methodology
Due to the cross-sectional structure of our data, we follow the empirical specification 
employed in the literature for this datastructure (Andrés,  2006)9. The model to be estimated is 
as follows:
εσσσσσσσ +++++++= SavingsRQFDIGovExpInflationMobileFinance 6543210     (1)
where,  Finance  denotes  financial  development  indicators,   Mobile is  the  mobile  phone 
penetration rate, GovExp refers to government expenditure, FDI is  foreign direct investment, 
RQ stands for regulation quality, Savings represent gross domestic savings and, ε  is the error 
term.  Robustness  of  the  analysis  will  be  ensured  by:  (1)  use  of  alternative  financial  
development indicators; (2) modeling with Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent 
(HAC) standard errors and; (3) RAMSEY’s Regression Equation Specification Error  Test 
(RESET)  for  validity  of  model  specifications.  Apart  from  using  alternative  financial 
development indicators, the four basic concerns of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
9A referee has also suggested an OLS approach with a lot of controls for the omitted variable bias problems. This  
suggestion is premised on the lack of  good instruments at a macro level necessary for an Instrumental Variabe  
empirical strategy. 
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are ensured. That is, while autocorrelation in residuals and heteroscedasticity are tackled with 
HAC standard errors, the assumption of linearity is verified with the RESET. As we have 
already discussed, the correlation analysis  in Appendix 2 has guided us to avoid issues of 
multicolinearity and overparametization. 
4. Empirical analysis 
This empirical  section addresses two main issues: (1) the ability of ‘mobile  phone 
penetration’ to be correlated with financial intermediary development dynamics  conditional 
on other covariates (control variables) and;  (2) the possibility of non-linear combinations of 
the fitted values explaining the response variable. While the first issue is addressed by the 
significance  and  signs  of  estimated  coefficients,  the  second  depends  on  the  outcome  of 
RAMSEY’s RESET. The intuition behind the RESET is that, if non-linear combinations of 
the explanatory variables have any power in explaining the response variable, then the model 
is mis-specified. Hence, the RESET is a general specification test for a the linear regression 
model. The null hypothesis of this test is the position that, non-linear combinations of the 
fitted values have no  explanatory power on financial development dynamics. Hence, failure 
to reject  the null  hypothesis  lends credit  to the linear  model  specification.  While  Table 1 
reports regressions of traditional financial intermediary dynamics of depth, activity, efficiency 
and size  on the  mobile  phone penetration  (mobile)  channel,  Table  2 reflects  the  mobile-
finance  nexus  with  measures  of  financial  sector  importance.  The  imperative  here  is  to 
examine how the phenomenon of mobile phone penetration is playing-out in the development 
of  formal,  semi-formal  and informal  financial  intermediary  sectors.  Discussion  of  results 
hinge on the assumption that, mobile phone penetration affects financial development only 
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through mobile banking activities. Hence, we might use mobile phone penetration and mobile 
banking interchangeably. 
The  first  issue in  Table  1  which  is  addressed  by  the  significance  of  estimated 
coefficients  is  valid  for  financial  intermediary  dynamics  of  depth,  activity  and  size.  The 
negative mobile  banking elasticities of finance point to the deterioration of the traditional 
financial  intermediary  dynamics  owing  to  the  phenomenon  of  mobile  penetration.  This 
negative incidence is more pronounced in financial system activity than in banking system 
activity  and also,  more witnessed in  financial  system deposits  than in economic financial 
depth. Two facts explain these disparities in weight of elasticities. (1) Mobile banking has a 
greater  negative  correlation  with  ‘financial  system  activity’  than  with  ‘banking  system 
activity’  because the former entails  a semi-formal  banking activity which should  also be 
negatively correlated with the phenomenon. The interpretation is valid on the condition that, 
the  phenomenon  also  negatively  affects  semi-formal  financial  intermediation  activity  (the 
difference between financial system activity and banking system activity). This is only logical 
because semi-formal finance according to the IFS (2008) definition of the financial system 
entails,  specialized  non-bank and other  financial  institutions  like  rural  banks,  post  banks, 
credit unions…etc. From intuition and common-sense, mobile banking  should therefore be 
negatively  correlated  with  semi-formal  banking  activities  because  of  their  quasi-formal 
settings.  In plainer  terms,  credit  (financial  activity)  allocated by the semi-formal  financial 
sector also has a negative correlation with mobile banking. (2) Financial system depth is more 
negatively correlated with mobile banking than does economic financial depth. This is only 
logical from common-sense and theoretical postulations elucidated at the first phase of this 
paper. Economic financial depth is overall money supply (M2) and is made-up of the financial 
system’s depth (formal and semi-formal deposits) as well as, the informal financial  sector 
depth (which is a great chunk of the monetary base: M0, in developing countries) that does 
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not transit through formal banks and other financial institutions recognized by the financial 
system (IFS,  2008).  Hence,  it  is  only logical  that,  mobile-penetration  has  a  less  negative 
correlation with overall  economic financial  depth.  Another  supposition resulting from this 
interpretation is the fact that, the less negative incidence on overall economic financial depth 
attests  to  a  hypothetical  positive  correlation  between  mobile  banking  and   the  informal 
financial sector (which is still not a component of the financial system according to the IFS, 
2008 definition). 
The second issue is addressed by the RESET. Overwhelming failure to reject the null  
hypothesis of this test points to the validity of the specification and suggests that  non-linear 
combinations of the fitted values do not have any explanatory power on traditional financial 
development dynamics. 
Three  points  retain  our  attention  on  the  significance  of  the  control  variables.  (1) 
Inflation  is negatively correlated with financial development, consistent with recent African 
finance literature on the positive association between inflation (inflation-  uncertainty)  and 
banking inefficiency (Asongu, 2011e). (2) Government expenditure could decrease financial 
depth  if  budget  allocated  for  investment  is  misallocated  through  corrupt  practices 
(Ndikumana,  2000).  Hence,   if   budget  intended  for  a  particular  domestic  investment  is 
deposited in a foreign bank account by corrupt officials, it is a loss in domestic money supply. 
(3) While capital  account openness in terms of FDI increases financial depth, it  decreases 
financial  efficiency.  It  is  logical  that  FDI increases  the use of currency.  However,  recent 
African  openness-finance  literature  has  found  FDI  to  significantly  deteriorate  financial 
intermediary  allocating  efficiency  because,  the  domestic  financial  sector  has  a  less 
competitive advantage in the financial service industry (Asongu, 2010). Therefore, it could be 
concluded that the significant control variables have the right signs. 
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Note should be taken of the fact that, Table 1 is based on the IFS (2008) definition of 
the  financial  system  which  is  comprised  of  only,  the  formal  banking  system  and  other 
financial institutions (semi-formal banking sector). Regressions in Table 2 however, relax the 
IFS (2008) assumption and integrate a previously missing component of the financial system 
(informal  sector)  into  the  conception  and definition  of  the  financial  system;  in  line  with 
Asongu, (2011a). This redefinition of the financial  system is premised on two counts:  (1) 
theoretically, the growing phenomenon of mobile banking is escaping the grasp of the formal 
and semi-formal financial sectors; (2) empirically our findings in Table 1 fail to demonstrate a 
positive mobile-finance nexus, which logically implies, the phenomenon may be positively 
captured by a missing component in the IFS (2008) conception and definition of the financial 
system.
Table 2 below is based on the Asongu (2011a) definition of the financial system which 
integrates  the previously missing informal  financial  sector component  into the IFS (2008) 
definition. Instead of using traditional indicators of financial development based on dynamics 
of depth, efficiency, activity and size as captured by Table 1, we employ measures of sector 
importance. Hence, we distinguish between the formal, semi-formal and informal sectors. We 
use two indicators of informal finance (absolute and relative measures) to distinguish between 
the growth in absolute terms of the informal sector (Informal 1), conditional on GDP and; 
relative  growth  of  the  informal  sector  (Informal  2),  contingent  on  M2.  Hence,  the  latter 
measures the relative importance of the informal sector with respect to the two other sectors, 
encapsulated in the IFS (2008) definition.  In other words,  Informal 2 appreciates how the 
informal  financial  sector  evolves  at  the  expense  of  the  formal  and  semi-formal  financial 
sectors. The last indicator (Informal & Semiformal) appreciates the extent to which informal 
and semi-informal finance progress to the detriment of the formal banking sector.
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Like in the previous table, two main issues outlined in the introduction of this section 
are assessed. Looking at the first concern, the following could be noticed. (1) Mobile banking 
is  positively  correlated  with  informal  financial  development.  Its  positive  correlation  with 
respect  to  the  absolute  measure  (Informal  1)  is  insignificant  while  that  in  respect  of  the 
relative  indicator  (Informal  2)  is  significant  at  the  5% level.  A logical  deduction  is  that, 
mobile  banking  is  positively  correlated  with  the  growth  of  the  informal  financial  sector 
through improvements in the informal sector’s share of money supply (M2) than in its share 
of GDP growth (on which the absolute measure is based). Hence, with the advent of mobile  
banking, growth of the informal sector is more pronounced at the expense of the formal and 
semi-formal sectors (constituents of M2), than to the detriment of many other macroeconomic 
variables (constituents of GDP). Plainly put, the share of informal finance is more relevant in 
M2 growth than in GDP growth. (2) The mobile banking elasticity of ‘informal and semi-
formal financial development’ (0.341) is higher than that of ‘informal financial development’ 
(0.340).  A  logical  interpretation  follows:  financial  deposits  (depth)  of  the  semi-formal 
financial institutions increase only by a thin margin owing to their positive correlation with 
mobile  banking.  (3)  The  correlation  between  mobile  banking  and  formal  financial 
development is significantly negative. This ‘banking system depth’ finding confirms results of 
‘economic financial depth’ and ‘financial system depth’  in Table 1.  
With regard to the second concern, failure to reject the null hypothesis of the RESET 
points to the validity of the model specification. Therefore, non-linear combinations of the 
fitted variables have no explanatory power on the financial sector importance measures. 
Three points still capture our attention on the significance of the control variables. (1) 
Consistent with Ndikumana (2000), the reason government expenditure could be negatively 
correlated  with  fianancial  development  has  already  been  explained  above.  (2)  Though 
microfinance (and other forms of informal finances) at least in its (their) initial stages can 
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strive without relying heavily on government regulation, too much regulation and strong legal 
institutions that permit the poor to borrow against their assets could significantly affect the 
smooth  growth of  this  (these)  sector  (s).  This  explanation  is  consistent  with Batuo et  al. 
(2010). (3) While low and stable inflation rates provide a conducive environment for financial 
development, high inflation on the other hand (as shown in the summary statistics) does quite 
the opposite. 
Before concluding, it is important to highlight a ceveat to this study. A cross-sectional 
analysis is a descriptive observational study. Hence, results should be interpreted with caution 
as the estimated coefficients of the exogenous variable of interest do not imply the “effect of 
mobile  phones” on various financial  dynamics.  Rather,  they should be intepretated as the 
“correlation of mobile phones” with the financial intermediary development measures under 
consideration. We report these as “correlations” because the descriptive analytical approach 
does not provide a good basis for establishing causality. 
5. Conclusion, policy recommendations and future directions
In  the first  empirical  assessment  of  the  correlation  between  “mobile  phone 
penetration” and financial intermediary development in  Africa, we have used two definitions 
of the financial system: the traditional IFS (2008) and Asongu (2011a) measures of financial 
sector importance.  When the financial  system is  based only on banks and other financial 
institution (IFS, 2008), mobile banking has a negative correlation with traditional financial 
intermediary  dynamics  of  depth,  activity  and  size.  However,  when  a  previously  missing 
informal-financial sector component is integrated into the definition (Asongu, 2011a), mobile 
banking has a positive correlation with informal financial intermediary development. Three 
major implications result from the findings. (1) There is a growing role of informal finance in 
developing countries.  (2)  The incidence  of  a  burgeoning phenomenon  of  mobile  banking 
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cannot be positively assessed at a macroeconomic level by traditional financial development 
indicators. (3) It is a wake-up call for scholarly research on informal financial intermediary 
development  indicators  which  will  oriented  monetary  policy;  since  a  great  chunk  of  the 
monetary base (M0) in less developed countries is now captured by mobile banking (informal 
financial  activities).  Hence,  the study is  purely informative  in nature.  In other words,  the 
paper has contributed at the same time to the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial 
development  and responded to  the  growing field  of  economic  development  by  means  of 
informal  financial  sector promotion,  microfinance and mobile  banking. It  has suggested a 
practicable  way  to  disentangle  the  correlations  between  ‘mobile  phone  penetration’  and 
various financial sectors.
Beside  rethinking  monetary  policy transmission  mechanisms,  other  future  research 
directions could include: (1) ascertaining whether and how mobile phones can lead to poverty 
reduction through growth and financial development; (2) an assessment of short, medium and 
long-term incidences of mobile phones on financial development is also worthy of note; (3) 
consequences of regulation on mobile banking and; (4) last but not the least, monetary policy 
tools that could fight inflation resulting from mobile banking activities. 
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Table 1: Impact of mobile phone penetration on traditional financial intermediary dynamics
Dependent variables: Traditonal financial intermediary dynamics






















Constant 1.216** 1.268*** 1.254*** 2.236 1.009*** 1.507** 1.517***
(0.015) (0.002) (0.002) (0.142) (0.004) (0.022) (0.000)
Mobile Phone Penetration -0.512* -0.579** -0.205 -0.711 -0.405** -0.675* -0.310**
(0.068) (0.015) (0.368) (0.384) (0.046) (0.060) (0.030)
Inflation 0.009 0.010 -0.017** -0.008 0.0001 0.005 -0.015***
 (0.918) (0.237) (0.019) (0.611) (0.983) (0.609 (0.005)
Government Expenditure -0.013** -0.009* 0.006 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 0.006
(0.029) (0.053) (0.144) (0.648) (0.427) (0.645) (0.169)
Foreign Direct Investment 0.021* 0.015 -0.031** -0.060 -0.006 -0.017 -0.008
(0.096) (0.168) (0.012) (0.167) (0.526) (0.343) (0.161)
Regulatory Quality 0.095 0.129 0.077 0.205 0.169 0.222 0.085
(0.381) (0.186) (0.554) (0.337) (0.105) (0.142) (0.132)
Domestic Savings -0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.0005 -0.001 -0.002
(0.703) (0.604) (0.258) (0.833) (0.842) (0.692) (0.105)
Adjusted R² 0.383 0.504 0.359 0.189 0.388 0.353 0.521
RAMSEY RESET 0.616 0.436 0.466 2.097 1.834 2.371 1.639
(0.551) (0.653) (0.633) (0.159) (0.189) (0.123) (0.219)
Fisher 19.038*** 19.419*** 5.954*** 2.154 5.016*** 2.818** 4.891***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.103) (0.003) (0.039) (0.002)
Observations 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
*,**,***:  significance levels  of  10%, 5% and 1%  respectively.  Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent  (HAC)  p-values in  
brackets. Fin: Financial. 
Table 2: Impact of mobile phone penetration on financial sector importance measures
Dependent variables: Measures of financial sector importance
Informal 1 Formal Informal 2 Informal & Semiformal
Constant -0.051 1.266*** -0.368 -0.364
(0.743) (0.002) (0.203) (0.209)
Mobile Phone Penetration  0.066 -0.579** 0.340** 0.341**
(0.437) (0.015) (0.046) (0.046)
Inflation -0.001 0.010 -0.009** -0.008*
 (0.469) (0.244) (0.045) (0.062)
Government Expenditure -0.003*** -0.009* -0.004** -0.004**
(0.004) (0.057) (0.026) (0.022)
Foreign Direct Investment 0.005 0.015 0.004 0.004
(0.180) (0.163) (0.565) (0.613)
Regulatory Quality -0.034 0.128 -0.134** -0.132**
(0.199) (0.183) (0.013) (0.013)
Domestic Savings 0.0002 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.716) (0.605) (0.102) (0.101)
Adjusted R² 0.108 0.505 0.520 0.510
RAMSEY RESET 1.654 0.474 0.097 0.165
(0.220 (0.630) (0.907) (0.165)
Fisher 4.690*** 19.220*** 5.826*** 6.309***
(0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 52 52 52 52
*,**,***:  significance levels  of  10%, 5% and 1%  respectively.  Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent  (HAC)  p-values in  
brackets.  Informal  1:  Absolute  informal  financial  development.  Informal  2:  Relative  informal  financial  development.  Informal  & 
Semiformal: Relative informal and semi-formal financial development. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics and presentation of countries
Panel   A: Summary Statistics
Mean S.D Min. Max. Obser.
Financial 
Depth 
Economic System Depth (M2) 0.339 0.242 0.079 1.022 44
Financial System Depth (Fdgdp) 0.273 0.226 0.042 0.895 44
Financial 
Efficiency 
Banking System Efficiency (BcBd) 0.706 0.344 0.252 2.249 51
Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 0.712 0.382 0.259 2.458 35
Financial 
Activity 
Banking System Activity (Pcrb) 0.185 0.175 0.027 0.715 44
Financial System Activity (Pcrbof) 0.208 0.244 0.027 1.423 44
Financial Size Financial System Size (Dbacba) 0.765 0.210 0.063 1.074 51
Formal F.D Banking System Deposits (Bdgdp) 0.271 0.225 0.042 0.892 44
Informal F.D 1 Absolute Informal  F.D 0.066 0.054 -0.145 0.217 44
Informal F.D 2 Relative Informal F.D 0.239 0.173 -0.336 0.727 44
Informal  & Semi-
formal 
Relative Informal and Semi-formal 
F.D Development
0.246 0.173 -0.336 0.727 44
Mobile Phone  Penetration 1.674 0.217 1.043 2.242 52
Control 
Variables 
Inflation 117.95 764.60 1.953 5304.8 44
Government Expenditure 5.488 5.843 -1.325 27.192 33
Foreign Direct Investment 4.675 4.731 0.062 23.203 41
Regulation Quality -0.680 0.617 -2.497 0.623 52
Domestic Savings 13.296 21.149 -50.018 80.104 48
Panel B: Presentation of Countries
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic,  
Chad, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, 
Gabon,  The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal,  
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania, Comoros.
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min:Minimum.  Max: Maximum.  Obser.:Observations. F.D: Financial Development. 
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Appendix 2: Correlation analysis 













Exp. FDI R.Q SavingsM2 Fd Bd BcBd FcFd Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba
1.00 0.97 0.97 -0.12 0.04 0.75 0.57 0.28 0.39 -0.36 -0.36 -0.49 -0.09 -0.24 0.35 0.43 -0.06 M2gdp
1.00 0.99 -0.06 0.16 0.82 0.69 0.36 0.18 -0.53 -0.53 -0.59 -0.05 -0.20 0.33 0.53 -0.04 Fdgdp
1.00 -0.06 0.16 0.82 0.69 0.36 0.18 -0.53 -0.53 -0.59 -0.05 -0.20 0.33 0.53 -0.04 Bdgdp
1.00 0.83 0.35 0.34 0.31 -0.28 -0.13 -0.15 -0.23 -0.04 0.05 -0.40 0.30 -0.10 BcBd
1.00 0.58 0.77 0.37 -0.53 -0.47 -0.46 -0.24 -0.19 -0.15 -0.41 0.43 -0.04 FcFd
1.00 0.92 0.44 -0.08 -0.59 -0.59 -0.58 -0.15 -0 .17 -0.03 0.65 -0.07 Pcrb
1.00 0.38 -0.31 -0.65 -0.65 -0.55 -0.12 -0.14 -0.07 0.61 -0.04 Pcrbof
1.00 -0.23 -0.56 -0.58 -0.35 -0.16 0.23 -0.45 0.56 0.33 Dbacba
1.00 0.60 0.59 0.23 -0.18 -0.26 0.18 -0.25 -0.12 Informal 1
1.00 0.98 0.47 -0.21 -0.21 -0.02 -0.60 -0.05 Informal 2
1.00 0.49 -0.20 -0.22 -0.05 -0.59 -0.06 Inf & Semi
1.00 -0.03 0.17 -0.23 -0.29 -0.05 Mobile P.
1.00 0.14 0.04 -0.43 -0.20 Inflation
1 .00 -0.07 0.04 0.20 Gov. Exp.
1.00 -0.26 -0.30 FDI
1.00 0.12 R.Q
1.00 Savings 
M2: Economic financial depth. Fd: Financial system depth. Bd: Banking system depth . BcBd: Banking system efficiency. FcFd: Financial system efficiency. Pcrb: Banking system activity. Pcrb: Financial system 
activity. Dbacba: Financial system size. Informal 1: Absolute informal financial development.  Informal 2: Relative informal financial development.  F.D: Financial Development. Fin: Financial. Gov.Exp: Government 
Expenditure. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. R.Q: Regulation Quality. 
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Appendix 3: Variable definitions
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources
Economic Financial Depth  M2 Money supply (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD)
Financial System Depth  Fdgdp Liquid liabilities (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD)
Banking System Depth Bdgdp Banking  deposits (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD)
Banking System Efficiency  BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank( FDSD)
Financial System Efficiency FcFd Financial credit on Financial deposits World Bank (FDSD)
Banking  System Activity Prcb Private domestic credit from deposit banks (% of 
GDP)
World Bank (FDSD)
Financial System Activity Prcbof Private domestic credit from deposit banks and 
other  financial institutions (% of GDP)
World Bank (FDSD)
Financial Size  Dbacba Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus 
Deposit bank assets
World Bank (FDSD)
Absolute Informal FD Informal 1 M2-Fd (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD)
Relative Informal FD Informal 2 M2-Fd (% of M2) World Bank (FDSD)





M2-Bd (% of M2) World Bank (FDSD)
Mobile Phone Penetration Mobpen Seven year average growth rate(% of population) AfDB
Inflation Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI)
Government Expenditure Gov. Exp. Government’s Final Expenditure (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI)
Foreign Direct Investment FDI Gross Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI)
Regulation Quality RQ Regulation Quality (estimate): Measured as the 
ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development.
World Bank (WDI)
Savings Savings Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP World Bank (WDI)
WDI:  World  Bank Development  Indicators.   FDSD:  Financial  Development  and Structure  Database.  FD: Financial  Development.  AfDB: African 
Development Bank. Fd:Financial system deposits. Bd: Banking system deposits. M2: Money supply. 
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